The Lok Sabha was adjourned on July 31, 2023, due to significant uproar from members of the opposition. The protests stemmed from demands for a discussion surrounding the recent Pahalgam terror attack. Speaker Om Birla made the decision to suspend proceedings until 12:00 noon as opposition MPs raised slogans during the commencement of the Question Hour.

The Monsoon Session of Parliament began at 11:00 AM after a break of over three months. The opening proceedings included paying tributes to the victims of both the Pahalgam attack and the Air India AI-171 plane crash. Following the tributes, Speaker Birla attempted to initiate the Question Hour, but opposition members immediately began their protest.

Birla addressed the uproar, asserting, “The government wants to answer on every issue. The House should function. You have not come here to raise slogans. The House functions as per the rules and regulations. All the issues raised according to the rules will be discussed.” Despite his remarks, the protests continued, prompting the adjournment.

The opposition, represented by the INDIA bloc, is particularly focused on demanding that Prime Minister Narendra Modi address the House regarding Operation Sindoor and the claims made by former US President Donald Trump about brokering peace between India and Pakistan. Additionally, they are seeking a discussion on the ongoing Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls in Bihar.

As this session unfolds, the tensions between the ruling party and the opposition appear poised to impact the legislative process significantly. The demands for transparency and accountability on national security issues highlight the ongoing political discourse in the country. The outcome of the protests and the subsequent discussions will likely shape the focus of the Monsoon Session in the days ahead.

Political tensions have escalated in Tamil Nadu following a controversial proposal to divert temple funds for the construction of colleges. This debate not only reflects the ongoing political landscape but also highlights a unique model of social justice rooted in the regulation of secular practices associated with religion. The framework for this model dates back over two centuries, originating in the former Madras Presidency, and has gained traction, particularly in southern India.

The legislative foundation for the regulation of religious endowments began with the Religious Endowment and Escheats Regulation 1817, established by the East India Company. Following the British Crown’s direct control of Indian territories in 1858, Queen Victoria issued a proclamation aimed at limiting governmental interference in religious matters. This decision stemmed from concerns about the ramifications of the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny, which was partly triggered by religious issues.

While the British government intended to withdraw from religious affairs, it maintained oversight of religious endowments in the Madras Presidency. British officials advocated for continued regulation, leading to a compromise: the government would refrain from interfering in religious practices while retaining control over the lands and secular activities related to religious institutions.

The idea of governmental supervision of temples solidified when the Justice Party rose to power in 1920. One of its earliest legislative actions was the introduction of Bill No. 12 of 1922, known as the Hindu Religious Endowments Act. This legislation faced opposition, particularly due to provisions allowing surplus temple funds to be repurposed for secular uses. The matter was ultimately resolved in 1925, and the law was enacted, establishing a precedent that remains relevant today.

The current legislation, the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959, retains the provision for the diversion of surplus funds. Under Section 36 of this Act, trustees of religious institutions may allocate surplus funds for purposes outlined in the law, pending prior approval from the Commissioner. The term “surplus” refers to any funds remaining after ensuring the temple’s maintenance and training of its staff. The Act also authorizes the Joint Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner to allocate funds if the original purpose becomes unfeasible.

The practice of endowing temples has a long history, with significant donations made by rulers dating back to 970 AD, during the height of the Chola Empire. Historian Anirudh Kanisetti notes that Queen Sembiyan Mahadevi strategically donated land and resources to temples, a tradition that continued during the Vijayanagara Empire. Temples served not only as places of worship but also as socio-cultural centers that facilitated education and community events, supported by inscriptions and architectural features.

The 1959 Act has been upheld by constitutional courts, permitting the establishment and maintenance of educational institutions, including universities and colleges, from temple surplus funds. These institutions are also mandated to focus on the study of Hindu religion or temple architecture. Thus, constructing colleges with temple funds is not only legal but also aligns with the original intentions of these provisions.

The debate surrounding temple fund allocation extends beyond legal implications, carrying significant ideological and sociopolitical weight. Historically, rulers supported endowments to enable temples to channel state resources towards essential welfare initiatives. During colonial rule, the British East India Company and the Crown recognized the necessity of overseeing temple management for revenue generation and local control.

In the last century, the Self-Respect Movement, which originated in the Madras Presidency, identified the regulation of temples and oversight of their resources as essential for anti-caste reforms. This movement laid the groundwork for legislative changes, including the temple entry legislation of 1936 and 1947. Presently, Tamil Nadu and Kerala are notable for having appointed priests from backward classes, following extensive legal battles.

Opposition to government involvement in temple affairs challenges the foundation of social justice established in southern India. The state’s role in ensuring lawful appropriation of surplus funds is well-established, and any reversal could undermine decades of progress in social justice and religious reform in the region.

The relationship between the United States and India significantly improved during the presidency of Bill Clinton, marking a critical shift in the geopolitical landscape of South Asia. As tensions escalated with Pakistan, Clinton’s administration focused on strengthening ties with India, underscoring a new era of cooperation and dialogue.

Shifting Alliances and Economic Reform

The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s opened avenues for the United States and India to mend their previously strained relationship. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the diminishing threat of Communism, both nations found common ground. The economic reforms initiated by India’s government in 1991 further facilitated engagement, as American corporations sought opportunities in what was then the world’s second-largest untapped market.

During the first Persian Gulf War, India allowed US military planes to refuel on its territory, a gesture that fostered goodwill. In contrast, Pakistan’s ongoing nuclear ambitions and support for militant groups strained its ties with Washington. Although the administration of George H.W. Bush never officially labeled Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism, it privately held significant concerns about its actions, particularly regarding militant activities in Kashmir.

Clinton’s Diplomatic Dance with India and Pakistan

As Bill Clinton took office in 1993, the shift towards India became increasingly apparent. Initially, the US was preoccupied with the implications of the Cold War’s end, which made it hesitant to engage fully with India. However, by Clinton’s second term, the focus on building stronger Indo-US relations intensified.

The situation took a dramatic turn in 1998 when India conducted nuclear tests, prompting international criticism and subsequent sanctions. In response, Pakistan also conducted its tests, escalating regional tensions. Despite these challenges, extensive discussions between US and Indian officials laid the groundwork for a renewed trust that would shape future interactions.

The critical moment came during the Kargil Conflict in 1999, when Pakistani-backed militants infiltrated Indian territory. The United States pressured Islamabad to withdraw its forces, signaling a commitment to India’s security and further solidifying their partnership.

Clinton’s visit to India in 2000 marked a diplomatic triumph. This was the first visit by a sitting US president since Jimmy Carter in 1978. Accompanied by his wife and daughter, Clinton’s genuine admiration for Indian culture resonated with the public and political leaders alike. His visit coincided with a tragic incident in Kashmir, where militants killed several Sikhs, deepening his empathy for India’s ongoing security challenges.

In a significant address to the Indian Parliament, Clinton acknowledged India’s right to determine its interests despite its refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). He expressed solidarity with India’s concerns regarding Pakistan’s actions, stating, “I share many of your government’s concerns about the course Pakistan is taking.”

In stark contrast, Clinton’s brief stop in Pakistan was marked by a different tone. The arrival was shrouded in precaution, with a decoy plane landing first to ensure his safety. During a private meeting with Pervez Musharraf, Clinton urged Pakistan to confront militant groups operating in Kashmir, clearly indicating that Washington held Pakistan responsible for much of the conflict in the region.

Clinton’s message to the Pakistani public was equally direct. In a televised address, he emphasized that “violence and extremism” hindered Pakistan’s democratic aspirations, further distancing the US from Islamabad during this critical period.

The dynamics of US-India-Pakistan relations during the Clinton administration illustrate a notable pivot towards India, characterized by diplomatic engagement and a shared commitment to regional stability. As Clinton’s presidency drew to a close, the groundwork laid during this time would continue to influence the geopolitical landscape in South Asia.

In the next installment, we will explore the complexities of George W. Bush‘s presidency, particularly in relation to the post-9/11 world and its impact on nuclear negotiations with India.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi recently completed a significant five-nation tour across Africa and the Americas from July 2 to July 9, 2023. This visit was strategically aimed at enhancing India’s position in the global critical minerals sector. The focus on establishing mutually beneficial partnerships for the exploration and exploitation of rare earth elements has gained momentum, particularly in the context of geopolitical and geoeconomic shifts. Countries visited included Ghana, Trinidad and Tobago, Argentina, Brazil, and Namibia, where India has been actively pursuing strategic partnerships to secure vital mineral resources.

India’s public sector undertaking, KABIL (Khanij Bidesh India Limited), has already secured contracts in Argentina. Additionally, the National Mineral Development Commission (NMDC) is actively engaged in various initiatives across Africa. India has been negotiating with the countries within the lithium triangle—Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia—to acquire mining concessions for lithium and other critical minerals essential for green technologies and advanced manufacturing, as stated by MEA Secretary Kumaran.

India’s Strategic Shift in Mineral Geopolitics

The demand for critical minerals has surged in the 21st century, where they have become essential for technological advancement. From electric vehicles to military applications, these minerals are vital for modern innovation. Currently, the global supply chain is heavily reliant on China, which dominates the processing and manufacturing of rare earth elements. This monopoly has allowed China to leverage its dominance strategically, often using it as a tool in international relations.

China’s historical success in the rare earth sector stems from decades of industrial planning, substantial government subsidies, and a willingness to overlook environmental concerns associated with extraction and processing. The Bayan Obo mine in Inner Mongolia stands as a testament to this success, creating a self-sustaining supply chain. By consolidating producers into state-owned enterprises and adopting liberal trade policies, China has managed to exert significant control over pricing and availability. This became evident during China’s 2010 embargo on Japan and its recent restrictions on heavy rare earths in April 2025, which underscored the global risks associated with a centralized mineral supply chain.

In response to these challenges, countries like the United States are ramping up domestic production and forming partnerships with allies such as Canada and Australia to diversify their supply chains. Japan has also taken steps to reduce its reliance on Chinese minerals by supporting Australian companies like Lynas Corporation. Meanwhile, the European Union is exploring alternative sources and enhancing recycling efforts. Despite these initiatives, the complexity and costs associated with processing rare earths continue to pose significant obstacles.

India’s Emerging Role in the Global Minerals Landscape

India’s potential in this global shift is increasingly urgent. With the world’s third-largest reserves of rare earth elements, the country is awakening a sector that has long been underutilized. The National Critical Mineral Mission (NCMM), launched in 2025, aims to undertake over a thousand exploration projects by 2030, fostering innovation in mineral recovery. Regulatory changes and fast-tracked permitting processes are designed to attract private investment and expertise, marking a significant shift in India’s mineral policy.

A key player in this transformation is IREL (India) Ltd, which has expanded its operations from raw material extraction to the production of advanced materials like magnets. With facilities in Visakhapatnam and Bhopal, IREL is now supplying products for aerospace and defence applications while exploring potential deposits in countries like Oman and Sri Lanka to diversify its supply base.

International partnerships play a crucial role in bolstering India’s mineral strategy. The India-Australia Critical Minerals Investment Partnership facilitates joint ventures and research and development initiatives, while cooperation agreements with Ghana and Brazil enhance India’s global reach. Additionally, India has established bilateral agreements for supply diversification, including a significant deal with Kazakhstan for rare earths and critical metals. Participation in international forums such as the Quad and the Minerals Security Partnership positions India alongside democratic nations aiming to counter China’s influence in the mineral sector.

Despite these advancements, challenges remain. The Atomic Energy Act of 1962 classifies monazite as a restricted substance due to its thorium content, which discourages private mining ventures. Furthermore, India’s domestic infrastructure for refining and magnet manufacturing is still in its developmental stages, and environmental issues related to radiation and waste management require careful oversight. The volatile nature of mineral markets also adds uncertainty to India’s ambitious plans.

India is currently finalizing a ₹5,000 crore Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme aimed at boosting domestic magnet manufacturing. Interest from companies such as Mahindra & Mahindra and Sona Comstar reflects growing confidence in the sector’s potential. Additionally, urban mining and e-waste recycling are emerging as sustainable practices that align with circular economy principles, reducing the environmental burden associated with raw material extraction.

India’s transition from passive dependence on mineral imports to a more self-sufficient and strategic approach is underway. The shift has sparked global discussions about alternatives to China’s dominance, highlighting India’s role as a serious contender in the critical minerals landscape.

As India navigates this intricate geopolitical landscape, its commitment to reform, innovation, and international collaboration could redefine global supply chains. The current moment presents an opportunity for India to transform challenges into prospects for leadership in the minerals sector. By investing in domestic capacity, fostering resilient partnerships, and embracing innovative practices, India can move beyond simply reacting to China’s actions and establish itself as a key player in shaping a more balanced mineral order.

In conclusion, China’s rare earth monopoly poses significant challenges but also serves as a catalyst for change. For India, this is not just a question of supply chains; it represents a crucial geopolitical moment. As the country enhances its mineral wealth, reforms its policies, and strengthens international ties, it is poised to alter global dependencies and create a more secure future in the minerals race. The path ahead may be complex, but the potential for India to emerge as a leader in this vital sector is clearer than ever.